Statement
by the Honorable
Duane P. Andrews
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Summary. Statement
by the Honorable Duane P. Andrews Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence) before the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs United
States Senate October 15, 1992, regarding the question of "evader symbols" or
"distress symbols" allegedly constructed by US POWs in Vietnam and supposedly
observed on satellite and other imagery.
Statement by the Honorable Duane
P. Andrews Assistant Secretary of Defense Statement
by the Honorable Duane P. Andrews Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence) before the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs United
States Senate October 15, 1992
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. While I am
pleased to support your hearing which is examining markings on buildings and terrain in
Southeast Asia that may relate to American POW/MIAs and to have this opportunity to set
the record straight on a lot of incorrect information that is in circulation, I have great
apprehension in discussing in an open hearing topics that relate to the capabilities and
practices of our Nation's Intelligence activities. I believe that it is a poor security
practice to "talk around" classified operations iniformation that was recently
widely disclosed in the TV and print media. It seems that we and officials that have
served before us have been indicted in the court of public opinion for ignoring signs that
Americans were left behind based on an inaccurate bill of particulars that was drawn up
using incomplete, selectively leaked intelligence.
I understand the frustration with classification
expressed by many in the general public and in particular by the families and Veteran's
organizations that are so concerned with the POW/MIA issue. They appear to believe that we
are unnecessarily keeping this intelligence material behind a veil of secrecy - that as it
relates to events from decades ago it therefore no longer required classified protection.
This is not the case. Much of what we have discussed in closed meetings is based on
current intelligence sources and methods. This is not, as some have charged, an attempt to
hide a perceived government failure to liberate our POWs. Rather, it is the fulfillment of
our obligation to protect those intelligence means and methods vital to our global
responsibilities in the defense of the Nation.
Notwithstanding his reservations about public
discussion of intelligence matters, Secretary Cheney has authorized me to present an
unclassified statement describing certain of our intelligence activities and other related
activities that were understaken in response to certain symbols that have been purported
to indicate the possible presence of American prisoners of war in Vietnam and Laos. These
symbols have been referred to in the press as the USA and K, the 1973 or 1573 TH, the
Morse Code K, the 52 or B52, the "arrow and P, and what were believed to be a series
of escape and evasion identity numbers that were seen by Joint Services Survival, Evasion,
Resistance, and Escape Agency, or JSSA, personnel on some photographs of Laos.
To the extent that I can in an open session, and
to the best of my knowledge based on what I have pulled from the reports of actions that
were undertaken by the Defense Intelligence Agency and by the JSSA, I will review our
current understanding of these symbols. Following my statement Mr. William Gadoury of the
Joint Task Force-Full Accounting will present his statement concerning certain activities
related to the search for Americans and the USA symbol. Colonel Bob Bonn, Commander of the
JSSA, Mr. Bob Dussault, Colonel Bonn's deputy, and Mr. Al Erickson, a SERE instructor and
evasion and escape expert, and Mr. Sheetz, Mr. Santora, and Mr. Knapper from the Defense
Intelligence Agency are present. These individuals are prepared to independently confirm
the accuracy of what I relate.
However, I must caution that in open session we
will be unable to present the full range of information available to us on these matters
-- information that we have previously presented to the Select Committee in closed
meetings. Any questions that require getting into classified information in order to
provide a complete answer will have to be answered in a closed hearing. Please do not take
this as an indication that we are not willing to answer your questions fully. We have
willingly made all of our documents available to the Select Committee and we will
willingly answer all of your questions. We just have to do so in a responsible manner when
dealing with sensitive intelligence or escape and evasion matters. If we divulge the
tradecraft used in either area it may cost American lives in future conflicts.
Before I review the specific symbols of interest
I would like to make a few comments concerning imagery. I believe that a short general
description of this topic will help you understand the complexity of the issue and the
technical photographs we probably think of the snapshots we get back from the drug store
or the one hour film processor or the portraits we have taken on special occasions. When
we talk of imagery we are talking about quite a different thing. Although some of our
imagery is produced by light directly falling on a wide strip of film, most is produced by
very high technology processes involving devices which transform the varying light signals
into digital signals. These digital signals can be read out on very high resolution
workstations -- a kind of film negative. Such imagery can be made up of a single view of
the area or it can be made up of two images taken slightly apart in time or from two
slightly different angles. This allows us to view the image as if it were in three
dimensions.
We examine such film on a light table under very
powerful optics. In effect we put it under a microscope. Interpreting the information
contained in a film positive or negative is not a skill you can pick up quickly. I was an
imagery analyst in my earlier years in the Air Force. It took me six months of basic
schooling and another six months of on-the-job training before I was considered qualified
to sign my name to an imagery interpretation report. Today, we send our analysts to an
additional three months of advanced schooling after they have had this basic qualification
training. When viewing an image it is often easy to "see" things in nature that
appear to be man-made but which on closer examination are shadows and foliage.
When an intelligence analyst has a question about
an area or a specific point target he submits an imagery request. This request is given an
appropriate priority and will be imaged. This image does not go directly to the
intelligence analyst that requested that it be taken. Rather, a skilled imagery
interpreter examines the image and prepares an imagery interpretation report. This written
report, and occasionally a print or photograph of the target, is forwarded to the analyst.
Some times when an imagery interpreter examines an image he or she will see something that
was not mentioned in the original analyst's request. An example is the USA seen by a CIA
imagery interpreter who was examining imagery of Laos for another purpose. In such a case
the imagery interpretation report is forwarded to the analytic section responsible for the
unexpected sighting.
I also should address why we are showing line
drawings of the symbols we are here today to discuss. A fair question is "You are
very open about what these symbols are or appear to be so why not show photographs of
them?" The reason is straightforward. If a camera scientist can get his hands on an
image he canb determine many characteries of the camera that took the picture. Its
location, its focal length, the camera's stability, its sensitivity to the varying
intensity of light, and a host of other technical parameters. We do not want the
scientists of other countries to obtain such knowledge of our technical capabilities. Such
knowledge would help them hide things from us that we need to see to support our military
forces and for national security.
Now I will turn to the symbols that have been the
subject of so much discussion. I will review each of the images of interest in turn. I
believe this will support our conclusion that of all the millions of square kilometers of
territory in Southeast Asia that we have examined over the years we really only have two
unexplained sets of symbols which were clearly intended to communicate something to an
observer from above.
The first symbol of interest is a 1973 TH. This
symbol was imaged on May 20, 1973 and again on July 10, 1973 on the Plain of Jars in Laos.
The Plain of Jars was a hotly contested area during the war in Indochina. Lao General Vang
Pao and his Hmong soldiers fought valiantly for control of this vital area which contains
within its borders the key lines of communication for central Laos. Control of the Plain
of Jars shifted back and forth between Royal Lao Army and Pathet Lao and Vietnamese forces
during the war.
The imagery, now unclassified, which contains
this set of symbols was obtained using an unmanned airborne reconnaissance system. It has
been interpreted as either a 1573 or 1973 and either TA or TH. None of the four possible
combinations of these symbols correlate to a classic distress symbol or to the escape and
evasion symbols that our crews were trained to use. Another explanation is that the four
numbers resemble a personal authenticator number but we have been unable to correlate them
with any individual. Although it is not what we would expect to be used by an unaccounted
for U.S. military person, the symbols remains of interest to the Defense Department
because they have not been explained.
Possible explanations for the appearance of these
symbols are many, though none seem particularly convincing. For instance, the U.S.
Government provided aid to General Vang Pao through CIA-operated Air America assets. Some
Air America crews were downed in action. One such U.S. Aviator, Emmet Kay, went down on
May 7, 1973 approximately 8 kilometers from the area where this symbol was either tramped,
cut, cleared or etched into the elephant grass. (Emmet Kay returned to the U.S. in
September 1974.) Some have surmised the Emmet Kay's Hmong crew might have made the symbol
during the few hours they were free before capture. The leader of the Hmong was a Major
Thao. We can speculate that he may have been trying to signal their location by
abbreviating his name. We may never know the answer to this as Major Thao died in
captivity.
Others have surmised that the symbol could have
been placed on the ground by a group of Thai personnel that were also captured during this
period by the Pathet Lao. TH, of course, is the two character U.S. country code for
Thailand. We know that these three Thai individuals were held in captivity with Emmet Kay
and his Hmong crew members. Many attempts have been made over the years to follow this
lead. Only recently, a new lead has surfaced indicating that one of the Hmong may now be
available for interview in Thailand. If we are successful in our attempt to interview this
individual we may learn more. But at this point, we have no way of knowing if the symbol
was or was not made by either the Thai individuals or the Hmong.
Another, and less likely, theory for the symbol
relates to the downing of an AC-130 gunship in December 1972, some 300 miles away in
southern Laos just across the Lao/Thai border. While only two crew members were known to
have survived, one of the crew members that stayed with the plane down to its impact on
the jungle floor was Captain Thomas Hart. Captain Hart is the only downed aviator whose
initials and loss circumstances could possible correlate with the initials TH. While
Captain Hart's remains were recovered in 1985 by the JCRC, even if Captain Hart had
survived, it is unlikely that he would have chosen to evade for over 300 miles through
some of the roughest territory in Laos. He would more likely have gone a relatively short
distance due West toward Thailand and freedom.
All we know for sure at this point in time in
1992 is that the symbol remains unexplained despite having been analyzed in depth on at
least four separate occasions: by the Pacific Command in 1973: by the JCRC and DIA in
1976: by DIA in 1986/87: and by the DIA, CIA and JSSA in 1992. Neither the DIA, JSSA, or
the JTF-FA have been able to make a correlation to any individual. While positive results
may have been hoped for in 1973-75, it is not likely that 19 years later we will be able
to pick up the trail in Laos. In short, the origin and meaning of this symbol is
unexplained and probably will remain so.
I will now turn to the USA & possible K
symbols. This symbol was imaged on January 22, 1988 in a narrow rice paddy Valley in
Northeast Laos near Sam Neua, Laos. This imagery was taken for a project unrelated to
POW/MIAs and was not looked at by an imagery analyst until early December 1988. While the
actual imagery remains classified, the line drawing we have with us today is unclassified.
As you can see, the letters USA are clearly distinguishable, and each letter is estimated
to be more than twice the height of a normal sized man. On the imagery, below the USA
letters some additional markings can be seen. Some have speculated that these markins are
in the pattern of the number 34 or even the letter K, or perhaps even a so-called walking
K distress symbol. This symbol was only imaged once. By the time it was discovered in
December 1988 by the Central Intelligence Agency and immediately brought to DIA's
attention, it was no longer observable on the ground.
Once this symbol was made known to DIA,
investigative steps were promptly taken. The full range of follow-up steps taken by the
U.S. Government have been briefed to the Committee in a closed meeting. What I can say
here in open session is that all appropriate means of information collection, including
the full range of intelligence assets avialable to the U.S. Government have been brought
to bear to no avail. Like the prior symbol discussed that appeared on the Plain of Jars in
1973, this USA symbol remains unexplained.
There is still disagreement as to whether or not
the markings and shadings seen below the USA letters are in actuality some type of evader
symbol. It is clear to DIA and CIA imagery analysts that the USA letters were constructed
by scraping away the rice stubble from a harvested rice paddy in dry season. One likely
explanation for what appears to some as a 34 or possible K is the dumping of extractred
rice stubble in several piles at random. Clearly, the supposed K is not in any fashion
comparable to the USA letters -- not in size, not in means of construction, not in spatial
orientation, and certainly not in clarity. When this image was further examined through
the application of sophisticated computer-enhanced analysis, including the use of
so-called false color analysis to differentiate between grey scales, this alleged K symbol
appears even more likely to be the mounding of rice stubble and thus even less convincing
as a possible K.
So what do we have here? No one, not DIA, not CIA
and not JSSA, can correlate the USA and possible K symbols with an unaccounted for
individual. While the Lao government has admitted that prior to 1973 prisoners were kept
in Pathet Lao headquarters caves located in the Sam Neua area, prisoners were not known to
be held there after the war ended. These caves have been visited many times in recent
years by Americans and other Westerners, and it was clear by the late 1980's that the
caves are no longer in use. Other facilities that would likely be used for hiding American
POWs are not known to exist anywhere else in Sam Neua.
I acknowledge that there have been isolated
reports of POWs being held in some areas of Laos, including Sam Neua. But after giving
these reports, most of which come from refugee sources, a full and complete evaluation,
the Department has been unable to develop convincing evidence that U.S. POWs are being
held in Sam Neua today, nor do we have any evidence they were being held there in 1988.
Mr. Bill Gadoury, an investigator who covers Laos
for the Joint Task Force - Full Accounting, has an interesting story to tell that may
relate to the USA symbol. As I indicated earlier, Bill will tell this story at the
conclusion of my statement.
Where we are now with regard to the USA symbol
can be summarized as follows: 1). The USA and possible K remains unexplained, despite
having tasked every means of information collection available through the intelligence
Community. Many collection capabilities have been exercised multiple times to no avail.
2). No correlation to a known unaccounted-for individual can be made by DIA, JSSA, or the
JTF-FA. And 3). Until an unexpected lead develops, there is little more that can be done
other than continuing to monitor the situation. We have discussed in our closed meeting
how we are accomplishing this monitoring.
I will now address the possible K symbol in Morse
Code on the roof of a building. This possible symbol was seen on July 30, 1975 when DIA
and CIA imagery analysts noticed several light spots on the roof of one building within a
known prison compound in Vietnam Northeast of Haiphong. The photography remains
classified, so DIA has prepared line drawings for our discussions in open session.
Noticing a distinct color difference -- some roof
sections were much brighter than the remainder of the roof on one barracks type building
-- CIA imagery analysts attempted to discern a possible pattern. They made a tenuous call
that the pattern could be a dash - dot - dash in Morse code, which could be the letter K
or the letters N and T. Although this was an admittedly tenuous imagery analytic call, an
intenst all-source analysis was mounted by DIA.
What they learned can be summarized at the
unclassified level as follows. First, the prison compound was formerly a French detention
facility, used later during the Vietnam war years as a provincial jail. We know that it
was used to house captured South Vietnamese commando infiltrators, several of whom were
ultimately interviewed after emigrating from Vietnam after the war. These former inmates
stated that no U.S. prisoners were even known to be incarcerated there during wartime.
Other sources provided postwar information. This
prison, known to us now as the Dong Vai Reeducation Camp, was used from late 1975 to late
1978 by the North to house former Army of Vietnam (ARVN) officers and other South
Vietnamese officials who underwent "reeducation" to prepare them for
"proper functioning" in the new socialist/communist unified Vietnam. Thus, from
late 1975 Dong Vai became part of a much larger reeducation camp system in Vietnam that
has been described to us in great detail by many of the thousands of South Vietnamese
refugees that have been interviewed by DIA's investigative personnel. Taken as a whole,
the body of reporting from Dong Vai paints a consistent picture -- this camp was used for
reeducation and not for housing U.S. prisoners.
A closer look at the photography of July 30, 1975
reveals some very interesting details. The front gate is wide open and no special security
measures are apparent. The roofs of a number of buildings inside and just outside the
compound are off, indicating probably rehabilitation of the jail facility, no doubt
preparing it for its subsequent use as a reeducation camp.
Fusing all this information, we see a very
consistent picture. First, after the fall of Saigon, Dong Vai was renovated and
subsequently used as part of the reeducation camp system. Second, the replacement of roof
tiles accounts for the color difference seen on July 30, 1975. In fact, the photography
shows that one section of the roof of the building in question is open, indicating that
tile replacement was still in progress. Further, photography of the compound taken in
January 1975 before this reconstruction process started failed to show any roof tile color
variations. And photography of December 1975 after the roof reconstruction was complete,
shows weathering of the sections replaced in July; no color variations are observable.
The Dong Vai reeducation camp had a rather short
lifetime. By late 1978, most of the reeducates had either been released or were moved to
other re-education camps further south. For Vietnam and China, the late 1970's were
punctuated by recurring security threats and border crises. We can speculate that because
this facility was so far north, the Vietnamese decided to close it for security reasons,
or perhaps it was no longer needed as part of the reeducation camp system. What is known
through recent photography is that the camp is no longer in use, many of the buildings
have been torn down and much of the former prison/camp area has reverted to agriculture.
In short, the fused, all-source analytic view of
DIA and CIA is that Dong Vai was not a facility that housed American prisoners; that roof
reconstruction accounted for the roof tile color differences seen only on July 30, 1975;
and, that it highly unlikely that symbols were consciously placed on the roof structure as
a signal. JSSA fully agrees with this assessment. We consider this possible symbol closed
and are no longer pursuing it.
I will now address the 52 or B52 symbol. Based
upon source reporting in 1979 and 1980 that American prisoners might be held in a
detention facility in southern Laos, imagery analysts began to review the area for the
presence of a detention facility. In doing so, the numbers 52, believed to be a possible
symbol were observed five times between December 1980 and March 1981 in a facility located
in the area southeast of the city of Nhommarath, Laos. The photography, which remains
classified, shows a possible 52 in an agricultural area within the camp. The possible
symbol was first observed on December 4, 1980, with subsequent observations on December
30, 1980, January 2, 1981, February 6, 1981 and March 8, 1981. Slight changes in the
structure of the symbol were noted from sighting to sighting and as late as March 8, 1981,
the symbol was still in place, however, the top portion of the 5 could no longer be seen.
The symbol was located within a row crop area
between the walls of an inner compound and the perimeter fence. Although imagery analysts
have arrived at different conclusions as to whether there was actually a 52 symbol or not.
Because of the variations in the size and structure of the possible numbers from
observation to observation there was strong suspicion that what the imagery analysts were
reporting as possible 52, might be nothing more than shadowing within the row crop area.
During continued analysis of the possible numbers, some imagery analysts reported that
there might even be a "B" associated with the symbol, however, the possible B
appeared to be another instance of shadowing within the area under observation.
The source reporting which was the basis for
requesting the imagery analysis came to DIA from the CIA which stated that the reporting
should be read with caution since there was some question as to the reliability of the
sources involved. As noted earlier, the facility in question was located near the Lao city
of Nhommarath, which is situated in Khammouane Province; the city of Nhommarath is within
50 kilometers of the Mekong River and the border of Thailand. The proximity of this
facility to Thailand raised doubts that the Lao Communists would actually hold American
prisoners in an area so close to Thailand.
In 1980 and 1981 there was not a large number of
sources as yet available who had visited the area or been within the facility near
Nhommarath. Nevertheless, photographs of the interior of the facility in question were
turned over to U.S. Government representatives. The photographs, taken in early 1981,
indicated that Western prisoners were not present within the facility. The exact measures
undertaken by the U.S. Government to inspect the facility and to determine whether
American prisoners were being held or not remains classified. In addition, the body of
reporting from human sources who had detailed knowledge of the interior and purpose of the
facility does not support the notion that American prisoners had ever been held within the
facility.
There was not then and there has never been proof
that American prisoners were held in the facility near Nhommarath. As a matter of fact,
continued analysis since 1980, photographs of this facility and human sources support our
best judegement that Americans were not held in the facility. The facility is now known to
have been a reeducation camp used by the Communist government that took power in 1975 to
educate former Royal Lao Army officers and certain officials from the Royal Lao
government. This camp has been described to us in detail by former inmates that have been
interviewed outside of Laos. There is even more reason to believe now that what was
interpreted as a possible 52 symbol was nothing more than the irregular furrows of many
individual garden plots.
I will now turn to the symbols referred to as an
arrow and a "p." In mid-1992, during a routine review and analysts of central
Laos, analysts discovered a possible symbols which included a large arrow and the possible
letter "p." These symbols were on the ground in December 1987. Further review of
these possible symbols revealed that although one symbol has the overall shape of an
arrow, the stem does not join the arrow head. The stem of the arrow may be up to 100' in
length. The possible "p" symbol appears to be nothing more than a scarred area
on the ground with vegetation, perhaps a bush or two, growing in the center.
There is no evidence that this possible symbol
has any association with Americans, whether living freely or in captivity. Explanations
for the possible arrow include natural limestone outcroppings or logs. An imagery search
was conducted in both directions of the axis of the possible arrow with negative results.
When imaged this area was undergoing the slash and burn process associated with clearing
jungle for agricultural use. When next imaged this area was under cultivation. While we
are attempting to identify refugees in Thailand who came from the area where the symbol
was observed, we have little hope of gaining further information on these five year old
possible symbols.
This gets us to the bottom line of the various
symbols which we believe were intended by their makers to be detected from above. To date,
we have two unexplained sets of symbols. One was imaged in 1973 and one was imaged in
1988. A full range of follow up actions were undertaken. None of these symbols can be tied
to a U.S. POW but neither can we absolutely disprove that "possibility."
I would now like to turn to some apparent evader
symbols that have been cited as recent evidence of POWs in Laos. These supposed symbols
were seen by members of the JSSA on a poor quality positive print of an image. For
context, the JSSA is a 65 person organizatino located in three states and headquartered at
Fort Belvoir, Virginia. As commander, Colonel Bonn reports to the Air Force Director of
Operations. The Air Force and JSSA are executive agents for the Department of Defense for
two major areas: Joint operational evasion and escape matters, and Code of Conduct and
SERE training. They have a third, more recent charter as an executive agent for the
purpose of drafting, in coordination with the Services and other DoD agencies, a
Department of Defense Directive on POW/MIA matters. The latter project is in progress.
Under the JSSA E&E charter, they are
responsible for working E&E operational matters with command planners and operators to
ensure tactics, procedures, equipment, and training are adequate and consistent with JCS
policy. The JSSA also acts as executive agent for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Force Management and Personnel with respect to Code of Conduct and SERE training. To
accomplish this they have a special training unit with 19 people responsible for providing
advanced instruction and exercises for selected high risk-of-capture personnel from all
the military services. This unit trains these personnel in Code of Conduct, SERE, and
hostage survival courses, both in residence and using mobile training teams.
The JSSA has also been charged by DoD to conduct
periodic inspections of five SERE certified training schools operated by the Army, Navy,
and Air Force; to research and analyze prisoner of war and actual SERE experiences for
lessons learned to improve training; and to maintain a Code of Conduct-related research
library.
That then, in a nutshell, is the JSSA. The JSSA
does not have an never has had MIA accountability as a functional responsibility. They are
not cognizant of all-source intelligence related to MIAs and have never been tasked by
anyone to conduct a comprehensive review of reports of downed, missing, or captured
personnel in Southeast Asia. However, in 1978 the JSSA did do a survey of Operation
Homecoming POW debriefs and compiled a data base of all references to sightings of
non-returnees. The only POW analytical role the JSSA now performs is to review POW and
peacetime hostage debriefs for lessons we can apply to the training programs we oversee.
The JSSA has never been asked to review DIA's MIA
efforts. The JSSA is not an inspector general and has no one qualified in intelligence
analysis or photographic interpretation to perform such a function.
Aside from the project to draft a DoD Directive,
the JSSA's current involement in POW/MIA matters was solely due to requests by the Select
Committee that they review poor quality, poor resolution copies of photography for
evaluation with respect to evasion and escape techniques of ground signal communication.
This they did with some degree of discomfort at being asked to be photographic
interpreters, a technical skill they do not possess and which was called to the
Committee's attention by the DoD POW/MIA Central Documentation Office -- this is the
organization that I established to declassify POW/MIA documents and to support the Select
Committee.
On June 22, the Chief Counsel of the Select
Committee requested that the JSSA evaluate the photograph containing the USA symbol
discussed earlier. The letter of request asked the JSSA to provide an independent
evaluation of the symbol's probably origins, meaning, and if they are consistent with
accepted SERE training and procedures. The JSSA was also asked to evaluate a photograph of
a second larger area some distance to the southwest.
In forwarding the JSSA's response on July 10, the
Director of the DoD Central Documentation Office cautioned Mr.Codhina, Chief Counsel of
the Select Committee, that the JSSA does not maintain a capability to perform imagery
analysis and that imagery was only one source used in the intelligence process and that to
fully comprehend the significance of a photo, information from multiple sources must be
considered and examined by analysts from an appropriate intelligence organization.
I regret that I was not personally aware of the
Committee's request to the JSSA and our response in July. I believe we could have avoided
the resulting misunderstandings if we had been aware that the JSSA was attempting in good
faith to perform a function that was well outside their area of expertise. Basically, the
JSSA personnel viewed a very poor quality print with a magnifying glass and saw a lot of
numbers and letters. They then matched these symbols against their authenticator lists of
missing airmen. Where these matches occurred they indicated that these might be possible
"evader" symbols. I do not want to get more specific on these symbols as much of
the escape and evasion tradescraft is classified and may well be used again. I am
concerned that all of the media attention to these symbols has probably compromised any
attempts by any possible surviving American POWs to use the symbols that were taught to
them in Southeast Asia.
Viewing a poor quality print with a magnifying
glass is just now how imagery exploitation should be done. This ignores the basic
principles of imagery interpretation which considers the pattern, shape, size, shadow,
surroundings, tone and texture of each artifact. When the JSSA personnel viewed the
original quality imagery of the printed photograph on a light table using high resolution
optics the nature of all the supposed evader symbols became clear. They were simply
vegetation, shadows or artifacts of the photographic production process. Some possible
symbols were even in the tops of 200 foot tall trees, an unlikely place for an evading POW
to leave a signal. When shown photographs of other locations including Africa and Utah,
the JSSA personnel also "saw" the same kinds of symbols -- symbols which again
disappeared on the light table. Each and every apparent evader symbol was reviewed by JSSA
on the light table and none were found to be real. Now I don't want to give the impression
they were imagining things. Often when you look at a photographic print you can see
numbers and letters in the shadows. That is why we do not normally interpret such prints
for intelligence purposes and that is why it takes a long time to train imagery
interpreters; it is easy to be misled. In this case it is unfortunate that untrained
personnel were used to support an unwarranted conclusiong concerning evader symbols in
Laos.
Mr. Chairman that concludes my
statement. I respectfully request that Mr. Gadoury of the Joint Task Force Full-Accounting
present his statement before we entertain questions. I make this request as I believe his
statement is relevant to the questions that may remain concerning the USA and possible K
symbols.
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